Following the outbreak of the US-Iraq war at the end of February 2026, shipping traffic in the Straits of Hormuz came to a rapid halt, a critical route carrying about 20 per cent of global exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was interrupted, directly triggering the worst supply of LNG in recent years. According to the Global Gas Report 2026 issued jointly by the International Gas Union (IGU), Snam Italy and Rystad Energy, as of May 2026, Qatar ' s exports of LNG fell by approximately 91 per cent each year, and about 20 per cent of the global supply of LNG (3 per cent of the total global supply of natural gas) was in a state of restraint, with a very sharp price response: the price of TTF gas in Europe rose significantly from about $20.8/MMBtu in March 2026, with LNG in North-East Asia at one point reaching $70/MMBtu. As of September 2026, exports of LNG from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had not returned to pre-war levels, and the time for the resumption of passage in the Strait of Hormuz remained unclear.
Several market analysis institutions and industry statistics show that the duration of this supply shock is well beyond the initial market expectations. In the early days of the conflict, many analyses suggested that passage through the straits would recover in the short term, but the stagnation of the last seven months had led to a general reclassification of supply chains that were supposed to be stable as “interruptible”. Wood Mackenzie ' s analysts at the Gastech 2026 Conference, held in Bangkok in September 2026, stated that there was general agreement among the LNG industry leaders present that, even if the Strait of Hormuz were to resume traffic, the LNG supply of the channel could be restricted at any time due to fluctuations in the situation, which would further exacerbate market volatility and complicate long-term contract signing decisions. Media statistics on trade transactions show that, following the outbreak of the conflict, five major Asian LNG buyers (other than China) in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand and Viet Nam were forced to switch to spot market purchases, with total spot purchases since 2026 amounting to $7.4 billion, while the same amount of gas purchased in the same period last year had to pay only about $3.1 billion in long-cooperative prices, at a cost nearly 1.4 times higher.
As United States LNG exports are completely independent of the Strait of Hormuz, the crisis has made the United States LNG industry a minority beneficiary. Many reports indicate that, prior to the outbreak of the conflict in March 2026, global gas prices were also widely expected to enter the structural subsector, the profit margins of new United States liquefied projects would be squeezed, and investment plans before the 1930s might slow; and that global buyers ' demand for supplies in the non-Gulf region surged after the Holmuz crisis, directly driving long-term contracts signed by the United States LNG significantly faster than in previous years. In September 2026, at the Gastech 2026 Congress, long-term supply agreements were signed by a number of United States LNG companies: a 20-year long-term supply agreement was signed between Petrobras of Brazil and the company Port Arthur Phase 2 of Sempra, for the first time in Brazil, for the purchase of long-term LNGs in the United States; Chinese gas was procured from the Luistinafolio gas source in Venture Global, restarting long-term contracts with Central America LNG following last year ' s trade freeze, which coincided with the Trump-Xi summit in Washington, D.C.; a 10-year framework purchase agreement was signed between Petrobras of the State of Brazil and Santos of Australia, for which Santos locked supply from the Ksi Lisems project in Canada for 1 million tons per year, 20 years, specifically to increase non-Australian supply sources in the Asian supply chain; and a three long-term procurement contracts were signed by Thailand ' s energy giant, PTT, including re-solding gas from Equinor, Norway, to GS Energy, with the aim of widening their own procurement In addition, capital cooperation with overseas partners has accelerated in many United States-owned LNG firms, and on 12 August 2026, Power LNG, LLC and the leading Mexican LNG infrastructure company Énestas signed a strategic cooperation agreement for the development of the LNG infrastructure in the port of Galveston to further build export capacity along the Gulf of Mexico.
For the American-Chinese community, this change in the market pattern of LNG has both potential opportunities and risks to be circumvented. First, there are industry-related opportunities: the rise in demand for United States exports from LNG will lead to increased demand for infrastructure, shipping, trade-related jobs around the export ports of Texas, Louisiana, and others. There may be more business opportunities for those in the US who are engaged in energy trade, shipping, port operations, energy investments, and the volatility of associated energy-type assets may lead to investment windows. But there are potential risks that are more easily accessible to most Americans in the United States: first, the statement that “the price of American electricity and gas is about to skyrocket” is inaccurate, that the supply of natural gas in the United States is now entirely self-sufficient, that the price volatility associated with the exports of LNG is mainly in areas around export terminals, that the energy prices of ordinary residents are still priced by state regulatory agencies and that there is no unjustified surge; second, that “high-return investments in LNG projects” promoted by some informal channels are exaggerated, that the benefits of this contract are concentrated mainly in large energy enterprises, that it is difficult for ordinary private investors to be directly involved, and that blind and wind investments may be at risk of compliance and losses; and third, that those engaged in trade with Central America need to be concerned with the uncertainty of trade policy, and that, although long-term contracts have been restarted in the recent past, tariffs, export controls, etc., are likely to adjust at any time, requiring advance risk.
The following steps can be taken in response to different needs in the US: first, practitioners of LNG-related trade, shipping and investment operations should pay timely attention to the latest regulatory policies issued by the U.S. Department of Energy and the government ' s energy sector, confirming compliance requirements of their own operations and avoiding unnecessary losses due to policy adjustments; second, if they are concerned with energy-related investments, they should carefully read the official disclosure documents of the listed companies, make decisions in relation to their own risk tolerance, and do not trust information from social media; third, those who have recently visited Asia and travel programmes should pay early attention to the energy supply situation at the destination, and some countries may be pre-prepared to charge their own equipment, understand local emergency power supply channels and avoid affecting travel; fourth, if there is a doubt about the adjustment of energy prices, they can consult directly with their state ' s public utility regulators, obtain official information, and do not rely on non-official sources.