Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu travelled secretly to Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, on weekends to hold a closed meeting with the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, which lasted about an hour. One of the aims of the mission was to ask the United Arab Emirates side to deny the news previously reported by the Israeli media that "the UAE leadership had sent an early warning to Netanyahu on the eve of the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023". The visit was first disclosed by the media and confirmed this Monday by two sources who knew about the Netanyahu trip.
The direct trigger for this covert visit was a press article published earlier this month. According to the report, prior to Hamas attacks on southern Israel on 7 October 2023, leaders of the United Arab Emirates had warned Netanyahu of an impending attack. Following the publication of the report, the Netanyahu office denied it. On this visit to Abu Dhabi, Netanyahu further petitioned the President of the United Arab Emirates to publicly deny the content of the report.
According to those who had direct knowledge of the meeting, Netanyahu had explicitly requested the United Arab Emirates to deny media coverage during the talks. This was also confirmed by a regional official who was informed about the meeting, but both requested anonymity because of the sensitive diplomatic issues involved.
The visit was not an isolated incident surrounding the early warning before the attack of 7 October. The media recently revealed that the head of the Egyptian intelligence service had also called Netanyahu a few days before the attack, sending a warning message about an impending attack by Hamas. This new revelations of early warning overlapped with earlier media reports of UAE alerts, resulting in a renewed examination of the poor response of Israeli intelligence agencies prior to the attack.
According to several media outlets, the disclosure of these early warning messages has created continuing pressure on the Israeli intelligence system and at the Government ' s decision-making level and has also served as an important backdrop for Netanyahu ' s covert diplomatic operation.
Media reports indicate that the head of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad accompanied Netanyahu to the UAE and participated in the covert visit. The presence of the Mossad leaders indicated that the subject of the visit involved highly sensitive areas of intelligence and security.
According to the media, the Iranian issue was one of the core issues in Netanyahu's talks with the President of the United Arab Emirates. Although the immediate trigger for the visit was the early warning dispute of 7 October, the Iranian element in the security landscape in the region remained a key element of communication between the parties.
The response of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates to this matter is somewhat complex. On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, through the official news agency WAM, issued a statement denying all reports of Netanyahu visiting the United Arab Emirates or receiving Israeli military delegations. The statement stressed that the relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel were open and operated within the framework of the Abraham Agreement and were not based on "untransparent or unofficial arrangements".
On the other hand, the media quoted sources saying that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, while refusing to comment on the meeting, emphasized that the United Arab Emirates maintained "open and direct channels of communication" with Israel and shared "all relevant information". The tension between the two expressions was of concern — the United Arab Emirates denied the visit and confirmed the continuity of intelligence cooperation between the two sides.
Media analysis indicates that Netanyahu facilitated this meeting with the UAE at a time closely linked to its electoral politics in the country. On the eve of the Israeli elections, the demonstration of diplomatic achievements with Middle Eastern countries such as the United Arab Emirates had political significance for the governing coalition. The manner in which this confidential visit was revealed — first by the media and then confirmed by sources — also reflects the importance that Israel attaches to the confidentiality of the trip.
The visit revealed several issues that deserve continued observation: First, the multiple warnings received by Israeli intelligence agencies prior to the attack on 7 October had not been effectively translated into defensive operations, and accountability was still advancing; secondly, the Emirates ' strategy of openly denying a balance with private intelligence cooperation could be maintained for long; and thirdly, the personal involvement of the Mossad leaders in such covert visits suggested that the level of Israeli-Gulf cooperation in the security sphere was far beyond the open.
Neither the official Israeli nor the official UAE officially confirmed the exact dates and details of the visit. The investigation surrounding the early warning failures of 7 October continues, and the contradiction between the denial of the United Arab Emirates and the statement of intelligence-sharing is likely to continue for some time to come.